Abstract
Can the meaning of the Qur’an, expressed in another language, retain the legal status of Qur’anic recitation in prayer? This reflection unpacks Thanawi’s compact reconstruction of an early Hanafi argument and his subtle distinction between words that convey revelation and words that were themselves revealed.
Introduction
The following is an attempt to unpack a particular argument discussed by Mawlana Ashraf ʿAli Thanawi (d. 1943) concerning the recitation of the Qur’an in a language other than Arabic. It is not intended as a comprehensive treatment of the wider juristic controversy. The passage addresses a narrower and more subtle question: whether the revealed meaning of the Qur’an, when expressed in non-Arabic words, retains the legal status of Qur’anic recitation within prayer.
Thanawi considers this question in al-Kilam al-Dāllah ʿalā Hikam al-Ḍāllah, a treatise included in his collection Bawādir al-Nawādir.[1] The following is a translation of the relevant passage, followed by an explanation of its underlying reasoning.
Translation of Thanawi’s Text
No. 81: An Explanation of the Hanafi Position on the Permissibility of Reciting the Qur’an in Persian
Among the possible proofs for Imam Abu Hanifah’s (d. 150/767) initial position permitting recitation in Persian, the following is noted in al-Talwīḥ:
“Alternatively, he may have understood the saying of Allah the Almighty, ‘Therefore, recite as much of it as is easy.’ (Qur’an 73:20) as requiring observance of the meaning rather than verbal composition, on the basis of evidence that had become apparent to him.”[2]
The marginal gloss states:
“That evidence may have been what has been related from some of the learned authorities: namely, that the particle min (lit. of) in the verse denotes partitivity. A ‘part’ recited from the Qur’an may be understood in two ways. It may be a segmental part (ba‘ḍ tarkībī), such as a verse, which is a portion of the complete text; or it may be a constituent part (ba‘ḍ basīṭī), such as the meaning considered apart from the Arabic verbal composition (al-naẓm al-ʿarabī). Each would therefore be permissible to recite even where there is no inability to recite in Arabic, since the general sense of ‘part’ encompasses both. This reasoning is intelligible only if the Qur’an is understood to consist of the aggregate of wording and meaning.”
I say: This accords with what is stated in al-Tawḍīḥ:
“Our teachers have said that the Qur’an consists of the verbal composition and the meaning. It appears that what they intended was the verbal composition insofar as it signifies the meaning.”
I say: It is also possible that the evidence in question was the saying of Allah the Almighty:
Had We made it a non-Arabic Qur’an, they would have said, “Why are its verses not clearly explained?” (Qur’an 41:44)
The argument may be set out as follows. Allah, the Almighty, here describes non-Arabic revelation as Qur’an on account of its meaning (bi-iʿtibār al-maʿnā). A necessary consequence of something being Qur’an is that prayer is valid through its recitation, for Allah says: “Therefore, recite as much of it as is easy.” (Qur’an 73:20)
It remains possible, however, that this consequence is subject to a condition: namely, that what is recited must itself be revelation specifically intended to be sent down in that form (al-inzāl al-qaṣdī). Validity in a case where the expression itself was intentionally revealed does not necessarily establish validity where no such intentional revelation occurred.
The meaning is indeed revealed, but not independently as the intended object of revelation; rather, it is revealed in subordination to the verbal composition (al-maʿnā munazzalun lā qaṣdan, bal tabaʿan lil-naẓm). The claimed conclusion therefore cannot be established with certainty (lā yathbutu al-muddaʿā jazman). Perhaps it was the greater weight of this possibility (rujḥān hādhā al-iḥtimāl) that led the Imam to retract this opinion.
Explanation
Thanawi is examining a possible basis for the early position attributed to Imam Abu Hanifah that recitation in Persian could suffice in prayer. The reasoning rests upon a particular understanding of what constitutes the Qur’an.
The Qur’an is described by the Hanafi authorities cited in the passage as comprising both verbal composition and meaning. If wording and meaning are both constituents of the Qur’an, it might be argued that reciting either constituent amounts, in some sense, to reciting part of the Qur’an. A verse would be a segment of the complete Qur’anic text, while its meaning, considered apart from the Arabic verbal form, would be one of the constituent elements of which the Qur’an is understood to consist.
On that basis, a translated rendering might qualify as the recitation of Qur’anic meaning even though it does not reproduce the Arabic verbal composition. The command, “Therefore, recite as much of it as is easy,” could then be understood as encompassing not only a textual portion of the Qur’an but also its meaning expressed in another language.
Thanawi next suggests another possible proof for this position. Allah says:
Had We made it a non-Arabic Qur’an, they would have said, “Why are its verses not clearly explained?” (Qur’an 41:44)
The movement from the first verse to this one is not a shift between unrelated proofs. The two verses perform different functions within the argument. Within the juristic argument reconstructed by Thanawi, Qur’an 73:20 supplies the legal consequence attached to something being Qur’an: its recitation fulfils the requirement of recitation in prayer. Qur’an 41:44 is then invoked to consider what may fall within the category of Qur’an in the first place.
The latter verse contemplates the possibility of a non-Arabic revelation that would nevertheless be called Qur’an. This may appear to show that the Qur’anic character of revelation does not depend exclusively upon Arabic wording. The same divine meaning, had it been revealed in a different language, would still have been Qur’an.
From this, the argument for permissibility may be constructed as follows. Non-Arabic revelation can be Qur’an by virtue of the meaning it conveys. Whatever is Qur’an may be recited so as to fulfil the requirement of recitation in prayer. It may therefore seem that Qur’anic meaning, even when expressed in another language, should be capable of fulfilling that requirement.
Thanawi does not reject this reasoning outright. He identifies an uncertainty within it.
The Crucial Distinction
The non-Arabic Qur’an contemplated in Qur’an 41:44 would have been non-Arabic revelation sent down by Allah Himself. Its words, no less than its meaning, would have been selected and revealed by Him.
A vernacular translation of the Qur’an is different. Its meaning is derived from revelation, but its wording is selected by a human translator. The translation may faithfully convey a revealed meaning, but the particular words through which it conveys that meaning were not themselves sent down as revelation.
The verse therefore establishes that Allah could have revealed the Qur’an in a non-Arabic verbal form. It does not necessarily establish that a human rendering of the Arabic Qur’an acquires the same legal status as a non-Arabic text directly revealed by Allah.
The argument for permissibility consequently moves between two cases that resemble one another in meaning but differ in revelatory status:
divine meaning expressed in divinely revealed non-Arabic words
and:
divine meaning expressed in humanly chosen non-Arabic words.
Thanawi’s point is that the first case does not necessarily establish the legal consequence claimed for the second.
What Is Meant by Intentional Revelation?
This is the significance of Thanawi’s reference to revelation “specifically intended to be sent down in that form” (al-inzāl al-qaṣdī).
The phrase does not mean that Allah intended the Arabic wording but did not intend its meaning. The meaning of the Qur’an is plainly intended as guidance and communication. The distinction concerns what was constituted as the revealed text.
The Arabic verbal composition, including its words, arrangement and expression, was sent down in a determinate form. The meaning was revealed through and together with that composition. It was not separately revealed in every possible linguistic formulation capable of expressing it.
This is what Thanawi means when he states:
“The meaning is indeed revealed, but not independently as the intended object of revelation; rather, it is revealed in subordination to the verbal composition (al-maʿnā munazzalun lā qaṣdan, bal tabaʿan lil-naẓm).”
The meaning is revealed because it is conveyed by the revealed Arabic discourse. Yet a later Persian, Urdu or English formulation does not itself become revealed wording merely because it communicates that meaning.
Put simply, a translation may convey revelation without itself being revelation.
Why the Argument Remains Inconclusive?
The legal consequence under consideration is the validity of prayer through recitation. Thanawi suggests that this consequence may attach not merely to the presence of Qur’anic meaning, but to meaning expressed in a verbal form that was itself intended and sent down as revelation.
He does not, in this passage, claim to have conclusively proved that direct revelation of the verbal form is a necessary condition of valid recitation. His argument is more limited. The credible possibility that it is such a condition is enough to prevent the argument for permissibility from establishing its conclusion with certainty.
If the legal consequence does depend upon revelatory authorisation of the recited form, the validity of reciting a hypothetical non-Arabic Qur’an directly revealed by Allah would not prove the validity of reciting a human translation of the Arabic Qur’an.
This is why Thanawi concludes that the claim cannot be established with certainty (lā yathbutu al-muddaʿā jazman). He does not say that the argument for permissibility is devoid of any substance. He says that it is not decisive because an alternative and weightier possibility remains: ritual recitation may require not only revealed meaning, but a verbal form that itself possesses revelatory authorisation.
Perhaps, he adds with appropriate restraint, the greater weight of this possibility (rujḥān hādhā al-iḥtimāl) led Imam Abu Hanifah to retract his earlier opinion.
Significance of Thanawi’s Treatment
Thanawi’s contribution lies in the precision with which he handles the inherited Hanafi discussion. He neither dismisses the earlier explanations nor denies that meaning is integral to the Qur’an. Instead, he identifies an unproven transition within the argument: from a non-Arabic verbal form hypothetically revealed by Allah to a non-Arabic formulation supplied by a human translator.
His intervention is therefore corrective without being destructive. He preserves the classical insight that meaning belongs essentially to the Qur’an, while showing that this alone may not settle the distinct legal question of what constitutes Qur’anic recitation in prayer.
The scriptural materials around which Thanawi’s reconstruction turns were already present in major Hanafi treatments of the issue. Al-Sarakhsi (d. 483/1090) discusses Q 41:44 within his account of the dispute, while al-Kasani (d. 587/1191) expressly brings Q 73:20 and Q 41:44 into the same argument.[3] Thanawi therefore revisits the very textual materials through which the earlier position had been supported, identifying within them a qualification that had not been brought to the fore.
This restraint becomes particularly significant given the reported uncertainty within the Hanafi tradition concerning the precise extent and basis of Abu Hanifah’s view. Abu al-Yusr al-Bazdawi (d. 493/1100) is quoted as observing:
This is a difficult question, since the precise nature of Abu Hanifa’s position is not clear to anyone. Al-Karkhi (d. 340/952) wrote an extensive treatise on the subject, yet did not furnish a conclusive proof.[4]
Against that background, Thanawi does not claim to recover the Imam’s lost reasoning. He offers a plausible internal reconstruction of the earlier view and then identifies the consideration that may explain its reported retraction.[5]
The retraction is thus not appended to the discussion merely as a historical assertion. Thanawi’s analysis makes it intellectually intelligible. Once the distinction between revealed meaning and a verbal form itself intended in revelation is brought into view, the earlier argument is not necessarily disproved, but it is no longer compelling. The Imam’s reported withdrawal can then be understood not as an abandonment of the place of meaning in the identity of the Qur’an, but as recognition that meaning alone may not carry every legal consequence attached to the revealed text.
Conclusion
The issue is not whether a sound translation conveys the revealed meaning of the Qur’an. It may do so faithfully. Nor is it whether that meaning was intended by Allah. It plainly was.
The narrower question is whether revealed meaning, once expressed in words chosen by a translator rather than in words sent down by Allah, retains the technical legal status of Qur’an recited within prayer.
The argument for permissibility places decisive weight upon identity of meaning. Thanawi’s qualification directs attention to the revelatory status of the verbal form. His reflection turns on the distinction between words that convey what was revealed and words that were themselves revealed.
There is a difference between words that convey revelation and words that were themselves revealed.
References:
[1] Thanawi, Ashraf ‘Ali, Bawadir al-Nawadir, Ed. Muhammad Nur Ullah Qasimi (Karachi: Bait al-Isha‘at, n.d.) Vol.2, 255-256
[2] Al-Taftazani, Sa‘d al-Din, Al-Talwih ‘ala al-Tawdih, (Beirut: DKI, 2012 ) 53
[3] Al-Sarakhsi, Abu Bakr, al-Mabsut, (Beirut: Dar al-Mar’rifa, 1993) Vol.1, 37; Al-Kasani, Abu Bakr, al-Badai’ as-Sanai’, (Beirut: DKI, 1986) Vol.1, 113.
[4] Al-Taftazani, Al-Talwih ‘ala al-Tawdih, 54
[5] Mahdi Hasan Shah al-Shahjahanpuri, al-La’ali al-Masnu’ah fi al-Riwayat al-Marju’ah allati Raja’a ‘anha Abu Hanifah ila Ghayriha (Tunis: Dar al-Malikiyyah, 2018), 43-44
